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"The Portuguese, more than any other people, adhere to that rule of
Scripture, that a gift maketh room for a man, and it is incredible how
a present smooths the difficulties of a solicitation; they even expect
it, and though the presents necessary are not considerable, since a
few dozen bottles of foreign wine, or a few yards of fine cloth will
suffice, this often repeated amounts to money."'
-Lord Tyrawley, 1738
"So rarely has political corruption led to punishment in Brazil that
there is an expression for the way scandals peter out. They 'end in
pizza,' with roughly the same convivial implication as settling differ-
ences over a drink."2
-The Economist, 2012
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I. INTRODUCTIONIT is no secret that Brazil's history has long been marred by an en-
demic culture of political and corporate corruption. As noted in a
2015 U.S. Department of State report, "[c]orruption scandals are a
regular feature of Brazilian political life."3 But Brazil is not alone, as this
socially and economically self-destructive environment permeates much
of Latin America. With a GDP of roughly $1.8 trillion USD, Brazil is the
world's ninth wealthiest economy according to the World Bank. 4 And
while Brazil's recent and prolific economic growth is indeed promising in
terms of its position in the global economy, there is another important
ranking on which Brazil's leaders may not be so eager to hang their
chap6u. 5 Brazil ranked 79th on Transparency International's 2016 Cor-
ruption Perception Index, 6 which measures the prevalence and perceived
effects of "public sector corruption," defined as "the misuse of public
power for private benefit."7 Luiz Navarro, Brazil's former Deputy Minis-
ter of State and Inspector General of the Comptroller-General's Office
(CGU), has confessed, "[a]s to the causes of corruption, we must say it is
a bit cultural. Still, we just can't wait for a solution to fall down from
heaven. We must invest in instruments ... to prevent and punish corrup-
tion." 8 Enter Brazilian Law No. 12.846, otherwise known as the "Clean
Company Act" (CCA). 9
The CCA was passed by the Brazilian Congress on August 1, 2013 and
went into effect on January 29, 2014.10 The government's new anti-cor-
ruption legislation is both comprehensive and unprecedented in Brazil. It
imposes strict civil and administrative liability on domestic and foreign
companies for engaging in corrupt practices against either the Brazilian
government or foreign officials." In light of the fact that bribery has be-
come a common, if not socially acceptable, way of conducting business
3. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affs., 2015 Investment Climate State-
ment - Brazil, at 18 (2015).
4. World Bank, GDP Ranking: Gross Domestic Product 2015, http://databank.world
bank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last updated Feb. 1, 2017).
5. "Chapu" is the Portuguese term for "hat."
6. Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perception Index 2016 (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www
.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption-perceptions index_2016.
7. Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perception Index 2010: Long Methodological Brief,
at 2 (2010), http://transparency.ee/cm/files/cpi200l-ong-methodology-en.pdf.
8. Carlos Tautz, Brazil: The Cynical Code, in THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS 2006 37
(Jonathan Werve & Global Integrity eds., 2007).
9. Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, Diario Oficial da Uniao [D.O.U] de
2.8.2013 (Braz.) [hereinafter "Clean Company Act"]. In writing this Comment, the
author has referred to the official English translation of Law No. 12.846, https://
www.cov.com/files/upload/E-Alert AttachmentBrazilianClean-CompaniesAct
.English.pdf.
10. Id. at art. 31 (per art. 31, CCA "t[ook] effect 180 days after the date of its
publication.").
11. Anthony Boadle & Dan Grebler, Brazil enacts tough anti-bribery law required by
OECD, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-bra-
zil-bribery-idUSBRE97111A20130802.
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and politics in Brazil, the CCA embodies a momentous anti-corruption
effort for Brazil. Its enactment exemplifies the growing public enthusi-
asm and political will in both Brazil and the region to seriously regulate,
diminish, and prosecute corporate and political corruption.1 2 And while
the CCA reinforces the ongoing global trend of implementing robust
anti-corruption measures, its scope, severity, and far-reaching legal force
are unparalleled among Latin American countries.1 3 With Brazil's un-
doubted status as a "significant political and economic power in Latin
America and an emerging global leader,"1 4 the CCA, though still in its
early stages, will likely carry important global ramifications.
This article will begin with an historical analysis of Brazil's innate cul-
ture of corruption that has evolved throughout the country's history, and
will identify the underlying causes that have facilitated this detrimental
social norm. It will then describe the deficient anti-corruption framework
that existed under Brazilian law prior to the CCA. The analysis will then
explain the culmination of factors that ultimately drove the Brazilian gov-
ernment to finally enact the tough anti-corruption regulations embodied
in the CCA. The article will also provide an overview of the CCA's key
rules and provisions, as well as the subsequent legislative measures that
amended and supplemented the original CCA provisions. After summa-
rizing the CCA's defining features, the article will discuss the current
state of the CCA with respect to compliance and enforcement. The focus
will then turn to an examination of the CCA's strengths and weaknesses,
from which the author concludes that the new law's promising aspects
outweigh the concerns voiced by its critics. It will then discuss the au-
thor's proposed focus areas for future developments and improvements
to the CCA. This article will also provide a CCA practice guide for com-
panies operating in Brazil. Lastly, the article will conclude with a pre-
scription of what will be required of Brazil's government, businesses, and
citizens in order for the CCA to bring about meaningful change to the
country's longstanding corruption problem.
II. HISTORY OF BRAZIL'S INTRINSIC CULTURE
OF CORRUPTION
A. JEITINHO BRASILEIRO: "THE BRAZILIAN
WAY OF DOING THINGS" 1 5
The widespread corruption that pervades Brazil's business and political
communities does not stem from a few bad apples. On the contrary, it is
12. See Nicholas Berg, David Peet & Deanna Foster, What Happens In Latin America




14. Peter J. Meyer, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33456, Brazil-U.S. Relations 1 (Mar. 5,
2010).
15. In Juliana Mello, The Brazilian Way of Doing Things, THE- BRAz. Bus. (Mar. 26,
2012), http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/the-brazilian-way-of-doing-things, the
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a systemic norm rooted in distinctive social and cultural dynamics that
have been a part of Brazilian life for quite some time. Brazil's history of
corruption is grounded in a unique cultural paradigm called "jeitinho bra-
sileiro" ("jeito" or "jeitinho" for short). 1 6 "Jeitinho is a social influence
strategy that is widely regarded as a component of Brazilian culture ...
[it] is an innovative problem-solving strategy in which the individual uses
social influence [or] cunning tricks to achieve goals, despite the fact that it
breaks formal rules."17 The word "jeitinho" comes from the Portuguese
phrase "dar um jeito," which literally means "to find some way."1 8 As
one scholar put it, "the gap between the law on the books and actual
practice is notoriously large" in Latin American countries, "[b]ut what is
striking about Brazil is that the practice of bending legal norms to expedi-
ency has been elevated into a highly prized paralegal institution called
jeito."19 Social scientists and legal scholars have variously described "jei-
tinho" as: a "process for resolving difficulties despite the content of legal
norms, codes, and laws";20 "the way to grease the wheels of government
... so as to obtain a favor or to bypass rules or regulations"; 2 1 and a
strategy to deal with excessive formalism, overcome bureaucratic systems,
or "us[e] resources, sometimes illegal, in favor of [one's] own benefit." 2 2
In the context of business culture, it has been observed that "Brazilians
have a sense of pride [about] finding ways around the regulatory costs [of
doing business]," and thus, jeitinho has been characterized as a competi-
tive process that rewards those who can most effectively and discretely
evade legal rules and regulations. 2 3
author explains that the term "jeitinho brasileiro" is loosely translated to mean
"the Brazilian way of doing things."
16. Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal Sys-
tem and Its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. Comp. L. 514, 515 (1971).
17. Maria C. Ferreira et al., Brazilian Jeitinho: Understanding and Explaining an Indig-
enous Psychological Construct, 45 REv. INTERAM. DE PSICOL. [INTERAM. J. OF
Psyci-roL.] 27 (2011).
18. FLoYD MERRELL, COMPLEMENTING LATIN AMERICAN BORDERS 68 (2004).
19. Rosenn, supra note 16, at 515. Regarding parallel cultural norms in other Latin
American countries, "jeitinho brasileiro" is a similar concept to Argentina's and
Uruguay's "viveza criolla" ("creoles' cunning") and Colombia's "la malicia in-
digena" ("indigenous malice"). See "Viveza Criolla" in Argentina, LATIN AM.
STUDIES, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/argentina/viveza.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2016); Mauricio Garcfa Villegas, Disobeying the Law: The Culture of Non-
Compliance with Rules in Latin America, 29 Wis. INT'L L.J. 263, 278 (2011).
20. Rosenn, supra note 16, at 515.
21. ROBERT M. LEVINE, BRAZILIAN LEGACIES 81 (1997) (also noting that favors (i.e.,
"jeitos") "imply a measure of reciprocity, a courtesy to be returned ... by a tip or
[ ] larger payoff.").
22. Ferreira et al., supra note 17, at 28.
23. Enrique R. Carrasco & Sean Williams, Emerging Economies After the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis: The Case of Brazil, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 81, 113 n. 225 (2012)
(citing Business: The Brazilian Model, ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17522484).
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B. DRIVERS UNDERLYING BRAZIL'S CORPORATE
AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION
One corporate construct that underlies the prevalence of corrupt activ-
ity in Brazil is the fact that its "business culture is predicated upon per-
sonal relationships" to a much greater extent than in most countries. 24
Inevitably, this cultural understanding facilitates not only the offering of
bribes by those whose personal network affords an inside track to special
treatment or more profitable opportunities, but also the solicitation
thereof. To be sure, Brazil's preference-seeking business culture is signif-
icant for reasons beyond the ethical dilemmas that such widespread cor-
ruption represents. The pervasiveness of this corrupt dynamic has had an
exclusionary effect on companies that may have otherwise pursued busi-
ness or investment opportunities in Brazil.25 To that end, the World
Bank's 2009 Enterprise Surveys revealed that nearly seventy percent of
businesses consider corruption to be a major impediment to doing busi-
ness in Brazil, as measured by companies' "rating of the obstacle as a
potential constraint to [its] operations." 26 When comparing that figure to
the international average of thirty-three percent,27 it is evident that Bra-
zil's corrupt environment is not just a potential or theoretical constraint,
but rather a real, identifiable deterrent in the eyes of foreign enterprises.
To be clear, this article does not argue that the underlying causes of Bra-
zil's corruption problem are strictly cultural. There are distinct aspects of
Brazil's regulatory and governmental systems that also drive both individ-
uals and entities to commit bribery and other acts of corruption.
Among the primary causes of political corruption in Brazil are the se-
ductive incentives created by the nature and role of political finance in
the country's electoral process. 28 One attorney general involved in the
prosecution of a recent corruption scandal. explained the recurring pat-
tern that occurs in Brazil's corruption cases: first, a company donates to a
political party or candidate in exchange for future advantages in the pub-
lic bidding process for government contracts. 2 9 In turn, if and when
24. Lindsay B. Arrieta, Taking the Jeitinho Out of Brazilian Procurement: The Impact
of Brazil's Anti-Bribery Law, 44 Pun. CONT. L.J. 157, 164 (2014).
25. See generally Sidney Vianna, Anti-corruption and Doing Business in Brazil,
ETHIC INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://ethic-intelligence.com/experts/89-bra-
zil-anti-corruption-trends (noting that "corruption affects Brazil's competitiveness
and its ability to attract foreign investments.").
26. World Bank, Enterprises Survey: Brazil Data 2009, http://www.enterprisesurveys
.org/datalexploreeconomies/2009/brazil#2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
27. Id.
28. Mafra Martini, Brazil: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption 2, TRANS-
PARENCY INT'L (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corrup-
tionqas/Country-profileBrazil_2014.pdf (noting that the high price of election
campaigns is related to the fact that "the winners are usually those who outspend
their competitors. . . . [thus] politicians and political parties have strong incentives
to fundraise for their political campaigns and, once in office, gain access to a wide
range of benefits and resources.").
29. Id. at 2-3 (citing Beatriz Bulla, Para procuradora, nova operagdo da PF mostra
'padrdo de corrupgdo' no Pats. ESTADAO (Nov. 20, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://polit-
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elected, the politician will then receive "kickbacks" or "overpriced con-
tracts for their personal enrichment [or] to create a slush fund for the
next election campaign."3 0 And the extent of this political manipulation
has not been well hidden, as many perceive "[p]olitical parties in Brazil
... as institutions that breed corruption." 31 .
Another driving force behind corrupt deal-making in Brazil is the ex-
cessive regulatory and administrative requirements imposed upon busi-
nesses operating in Brazil.32 This contention has been duly corroborated
by multiple global reports. In the World Bank's 2015 Ease of Doing Busi-
ness Index, which examines how conducive countries' regulatory environ-
ments are to starting and operating a business, placed Brazil 116th out of
189 countries.3 3 With respect to the ease of creating a business, dealing
with construction permits, paying taxes, and trading across borders, all of
which require interaction with a public body, Brazil's global rankings
were an abysmal 174th, 169th, 178th, and 145th, respectively.34 Accord-
ing to TMF Group's 2015 Global Benchmark Complexity Index,35 which
ranks countries based on how difficult it is to do business from a regula-
tory and compliance perspective, Brazil is the "10th most complex nation
in the world for multinational companies to stay compliant with corpo-
rate regulation and legislation." 3 6
The byproduct of such excessive bureaucracy is the "leverage [of public
officials] to solicit illegal payments . . . to facilitate or hinder administra-
tive processes." 37 This arguably unnecessary degree of bureaucracy has
led at least some scholars to assert that Brazil's leaders have deliberately
and continuously regenerated this cycle in order to sustain the incentives
for businesses to offer bribes to public officials. As one law journal arti-
cle explains, "[o]fficials accustomed to corrupt systems will be likely to
enact more regulations in an effort to increase their opportunities to col-
lect bribes while further hindering the development of ethical busi-
ica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,para-procuradora-nova-operacao-da-pf-mostra-
padrao-de-corrupcao-no-pais,1595635).
30. Id. at 3.
31. Corporate Ties to Political Parties: Implications of the Clean Companies Act,
TRACE INT'L (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.traceinternational.org/blog/164/Corpor
ateTiesto PoliticalPartiesImplications of the CleanCompaniesAct.
32. BRIAN P. LOUGHMAN & RICHARD A. SIBERY, BRIBERY AND CORRUrION: NAVI-
GATING THE GLO3AL RISKS 278 (2012) (arguing that "[c]orruption stems from
dealing with local-level governments and a wide-range of regulatory agencies in
order to do business, increasing the likelihood of bribery.").
33. World Bank, Doing Business: Economy Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/
rankings (last updated June 2015).
34. Id.
35. Global Benchmark Complexity Index 2015: A Global Study of Corporate Secreta-
rial Governance, TMF GROUP (Feb. 2016), http://tmf.foxps.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/Global-Benchmark-Complexity-Index-2015-small.pdf.
36. TMF Grp., Brazil Ranked Among The World's 10 Most Complex Countries For
Business Compliance, MONDAQ (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/brazil/x/
470562/Compliance/Brazil+Ranked+Among+The+Worlds+10+Most+Complex+
Countries+For+Business+Compliance. The problem is so bad that this was actu-
ally an improvement - Brazil ranked 2nd in 2014.
37. Martini, supra note 28.
BRAZIL'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE
nesses." 38 Given the immense burdens of complying with gratuitous
regulatory obligations, perhaps we should be less surprised that so many
Brazilian businesses are willing to offer a few inside payments to cut
through some of the red tape and expedite these cumbersome processes.
An additional factor underlying Brazil's corruption problem is the gov-
ernment's broad decentralization of authority combined with its weak
federal oversight of municipalities' extensive discretionary powers. This
dynamic is problematic because "levels of corruption are higher at the
state and local level, in comparison to federal levels in Brazil."3 9 Thus,
the generous resources and broad decision-making power that Brazil's
government bestows upon local officials, though well-intended, ultimately
facilitates more opportunities for corruption to go undetected.
III. BRAZIL'S PRE-CCA LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CORRUPTION REGULATION
Brazil's criminal code has prohibited bribery and other acts of corrup-
tion since the 18th century.40 But despite having in place criminal anti-
corruption laws on the books, Brazil has had a notorious record of not
using them. Historically, "[o]ccasionally, a few egregious cases of corrup-
tion were prosecuted, but after lengthy court proceedings cluttered by
procedural appeals, they had meaningless outcomes and entailed no pun-
ishment, exhibiting the unwritten principle captured in a popular saying:
'For friends, everything; for enemies, the law." 41
Throughout the 1990s, Brazil finally began to "demonstrate a serious
commitment to combat the bribery of public officials," passing various
"penal laws to combat corruption, including legislation against bribery-
related money laundering, securities fraud, concealment of assets, and ec-
onomic power abuse." 42 However, while bribery has always been a crimi-
38. Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Emerging
Markets: Company Decision-Making in A Regulated World, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 1201, 1279 (2013) (citing Cyavash N. Ahmadi, Regulating the Regulators: A
Solution to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Woes, 11 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 351, 363
(2012) (describing bribery in heavily regulated bureaucracies as an "eco-cycle")).
39. Lindsey Carson & Marian M. Prado, Mapping Corruption and its Institutional De-
terminants in Brazil 34 (Int'l Res. Initiative on Braz. & Afr. (IRIBA), Working




40. Antenor Madruga, Ana Belotto & Mariana Tumbiolo, Client Alert Brazil: The
Brazilian Clean Companies Act, ROXIN ALL. (Sept. 2015), http://www.roxin-alli-
ance.org/uploads/media/ROXINClientAlertBrazil.pdf.
41. Paulo Sotero, Scandals Have Made Brazilians Less Tolerant of Corruption on High
Places, WILSON CTR. - BRAZ. INST. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
article/scandals-have-made-brazilians-less-tolerant-corruption-high-places-0.
42. Geida D. Sanlate, Daniela Sedes & Juan C. Varela, Brazil's New Anti-Corruption
Law: What Every Multinational Employer Should Know, LrtrLER MENDELSON
P.C. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/2013-08_ASAPBrazil
Anti-CorruptionLawI WhatEveryMultinational EmployerShouldKnow
.pdf. See also Org. for Econ Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Report, Steps Taken
by State Parties to Implement and Enforce the Convention on Combating Bribery of
2016] 389
390 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
nal offense in Brazil, entities, by legal definition, cannot act with the
requisite intent necessary to establish criminal liability, which means Bra-
zilian courts are legally unable to convict corporations of crimes. 43
Hence, under Brazilian law as it existed before the CCA, only individuals
could be held liable for bribing public officials; the companies that
benefitted from the corrupt conduct, however, were immune from any
and all punishment, civil or criminal. 44
Moreover, while individuals could be criminally prosecuted in Brazil
for corruption committed domestically, Brazilian laws lacked any legal
mechanism to address or establish liability, personal or corporate, for the
bribery of foreign officials. 45 It was against this backdrop that the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) insisted
that Brazil take some legislative action to address this shortcoming, spe-
cifically with respect to corporate liability for corrupt practices in interna-
tional business dealings.46 That is, after Brazil officially adopted the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offices in
International Business Transactions (the "OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion") in 2000, the OECD Working Group on Bribery made clear in a
2007 Review that Brazil needed to "take urgent steps to establish the
direct liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public offi-
cial." 47 In sum, it had become clear in the years leading up to the CCA
that whatever Brazil was doing to combat corruption was simply not get-
ting the job done. Put simply, Brazil's "anti-bribery legislation was weak
by international standards, and failed to deter corrupt acts." 48
IV. THE CCA'S CATALYSTS
The mounting pressure on Brazil's leaders to adopt meaningful legisla-
tion to address the nation's rampant corruption problem was driven
largely by two key forces: the Brazilian people and the OECD. In June
of 2013, the people of Brazil finally rallied together and took to the
streets in massive fashion to send a clear message to their historically
corrupt political leaders. It was reported that over a million people took
part in the 2013 protests, and their efforts spanned more than one hun-
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 17-18 (Sept.
2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-Steps-Taken-Update.pdf.
43. See Kierstan L. Carlson & Shawn M. Wright, Brazil's New Anti-Bribery Act Goes
Into Effect in January 2014-Is Your Company Ready?, BLANK ROME LLP (Dec.
2013), https://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentlD=37&itemlD=3224.
44. Id.
45. See Sanlate et al., supra note 42.
46. See Org. for Econ Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Working Grp. on Brib-
ery in Int'l Bus. Transactions, Brazil: Phase 2 - Report on the Application of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Bus-
iness Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in Interna-
tional Transactions, at 65 (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/39801089.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Arrieta, supra note 24, at 170.
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dred cities throughout Brazil.49 In the protestors' words, their rally cries
were aimed at "ending the [ ] impunity and lack of accountability of polit-
ical leaders"; Brazilians had grown "so disgusted with the system, so fed
up that now [they were] demanding change."5 0 These demands and the
anger from which they stemmed were undoubtedly justified - a 2012
study by the Federation of Industries of Sio Paulo revealed that corrup-
tion costs Brazil somewhere between 1.4% to 2.3% of its GDP each year,
which amounts to roughly $146 billion USD. 51 Given the success Brazil
had been experiencing in the global economy and the pronounced in-
creases in its national income, Brazilians rightfully expected the nation's
recent economic gains to translate into improved public goods and en-
hanced welfare, but they took to the streets precisely because this was not
the case.52
As briefly discussed in Part III above, the second driving force behind
Brazil's ultimate passage of the CCA was a not-so-subtle directive from
the OECD. It is important to note that Brazil is a signatory to three
different international anti-corruption conventions: the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention,5 3 the Inter-American Convention Against Corrup-
tion,54 and the U.N. Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). 55 Like
all nations that have ratified such treaties, Brazil agreed to honor and
fulfill their shared commitment to impose liability on legal entities for
corrupt acts. 56 In 2010, a full ten years after Brazil adopted the OECD
Convention, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted yet again that,
despite the OECD's insistence in its previous 2007 review of Brazil's anti-
bribery laws, "Brazil ha[d] still not implemented effective liability of legal
persons [i.e., business entities] for foreign bribery."5 7 Due to Brazil's
49. Brazil Unrest: 'Million'Join Protests in 100 Cities, BBC NEws (June 21,2013, 12:17
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22992410.
50. Id.; Michelle A. Winters, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Battling Corporate Cor-
ruption in Brazil and the Problems with A Decentralized Enforcement Model, 13
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 681, 682 (2015).
51. 12th Global Fraud Survey, Growing Beyond: A Place for Integrity - Regional In-
sights: Brazil, ERNST & YOUNG (2012), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Assur-
ance/Fraud-Investigation--Dispute-Services/Global-Fraud-Survey--a-place-for-
integrity--Brazil (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
52. Nathaniel P. Flannery, Are Brazil's Protests a Sign of Deeper Economic Imbal-
ance?, FORBES (June 24, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathaniel
parishflannery/2013/06/24/are-brazils-protests-a-sign-of-deeper-economic-imbalan
ces/#4b5fb8b5386a.
53. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1
(1998) (ratified by Brazil in 2000).
54. Org. of Am. States (OAS), Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IA-
CAC), Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1997) (ratified in Brazil in 2002).
55. U.N. Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41,
43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) (ratified in Brazil in 2005).
56. Lindsey Carson, Izabela Correa & Mariana Prado, The Brazilian Clean Company
Act: Using Institutional Multiplicity for Effective Punishment, 12 OSGOODE HALL
L. J. (Osgoode Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 48/2015, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2673799.
57. Org. for Econ Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Working Grp. on Bribery in
Int'l Bus. Transactions, Brazil Phase 2: Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of
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continuing failure to institute legislative measures for establishing corpo-
rate liability, the OECD demanded in no uncertain terms that Brazil
"pass this legislation promptly."5 8 In other words, the OECD was un-
equivocally telling Brazilian officials to clean up their act and abide by
their international legal obligation to enact and enforce regulatory mea-
sures to hold companies liable for corrupt conduct.
As a result of the accumulating pressure brought on by these converg-
ing forces, 59 Brazil officials finally proposed and approved a new anti-
corruption law of unprecedented magnitude-the CCA-and embarked
on its long-overdue mission to mend Brazil's global image and fulfill "the
country's commitment to curb palm-greasing under the OECD's anti-
bribery convention. "60
V. THE CCA AND ITS AMENDMENTS: LAW NO. 12.846,
DECREE NO. 8.420, PROVISIONAL MEASURE NO. 703,
AND CGU REGULATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
The CCA was officially enacted in January of 2014. Characterized as
"[t]he 'next big thing' in global anti-corruption,"6 1 the new law embodies
a regulatory scheme where, for the first time in Brazil's history, corpora-
tions will be held liable for the corrupt conduct of their directors, officers,
and agents. 62 The CCA applies to incorporated and unincorporated "le-
gal persons," "whether foreign or domiciled in Brazil, and whether the
unlawful act is committed within or outside of Brazil."6 3 Among the
CCA's fundamental principles, perhaps most significant is its imposition
of strict civil and administrative liability "for conduct against the Brazil-
ian or foreign governments, which includes promising, offering or giving,
directly or indirectly, any 'improper advantage' to a public official or re-
lated third person." 64 While the CCA achieves its intended purpose of
holding corporate entities legally accountable, it is worth emphasizing
that the new law contemplates only civil and administrative liability; the
the Phase 2 Recommendations, at 4 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
anti-briberyconvention/45518279.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See Arrieta, supra note 24, at 159.
60. Brazil's New Anti-Corruption Law: Hard to Read, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2014,
9:40PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/brazil-s-new-anti-
corruption-law.
61. T. Markus Funk & Mikhail Reider-Gordon, The 'Next Big Thing' in Global Anti-
Corruption: The Brazil Clean Companies Act, 27 WESTLAW J. Gov'T CoNr. 1, 1
(2014).
62. Michelle Richard, Brazil's Landmark Anti-Corruption Law, 20 L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 357, 360 (2014).
63. Michael Diaz, Jr. & Marcela C. Blanco, Fighting Corruption in International Trans-
actions, DIAZ, REUS & TARG LLP (Dec. 15, 2015), http://diazreus.com/fighting-
corruption-in-in ternational-transactions/.
64. Adria Perez, Parallel Lives: How Brazil and the United States Consider Leniency
Agreements and Compliance Programs, 33 N.Y.S.B.A. INSIDE 20, 20 (2015) (citing
CCA, art. 5(I)).
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CCA does not change Brazil's legal tradition of immunizing corporations
and legal entities from criminal liability.6 5
It is undeniable that the passage of the CCA was a monumental mo-
ment in Brazil's anti-corruption movement. But soon after its enactment,
many believed the law's initial parameters were too ambiguous with re-
spect to its intended methods of implementation and enforcement. 66 As
a result, supplemental legislation was enacted in 2015 to further refine the
CCA and provide greater legal clarity surrounding its implementation. 67
Such measures included Decree No. 8.420 (the "Decree") (passed on
March 18, 2015),68 Ordinance Nos. 909 and 910 (passed in April of 2015),
and Provisional Measure No. 703 (MP 703) (provisionally enacted on De-
cember 21, 2015).69 Collectively, these regulations clarified the process
for imposing administrative liability, set guidelines for calculating fines,
updated the rules governing leniency agreements, and provided specific
criteria for the government's assessment of companies' internal compli-
ance programs. 70
65. In Sonia Zaheer, Brazil's Landmark Clean Company Act: Comparison to the
OECD Ahti-Bribery Convention and Issues, 28 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &
DEV. L. J. 457, 468 (2015), the author noted that the sole exception to this long-
held rule of exempting corporations from criminal liability is a provision in Brazil's
Constitution for "Crimes Against the Environment," but as of 2012, this exception,
which permits criminal punishment for entities' acts "injurious to the environ-
ment," has only been asserted once in Brazil's history. See also Org. for Econ Co-
operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Working Grp. on Bribery in Int'l Bus. Transac-
tions, Brazil: Phase 1 Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Rec-
ommendation, at 2 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/33742137.pdf.
66. See Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, The Year 2015 in Anti-Bribery Enforcement: Are
Companies in the Eye of an Enforcement Storm?, 7 FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 2016),
http://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2016/01/
fcpaupdatejanuary_2016.pdf.
67. Esther Flesch et al., Brazil Amends Leniency Agreement Rules Under the BCCA,
FCPAMERICAS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://fcpamericas.com/english/brazil/brazil-am
ends-leniency-agreement-rules-bcca/.
68. Decreto No. 8.420, de 18 de Margo de 2015, Didrio Oficial da Unito [D.O.U.] de
3.19.2015 (Braz.). Per the Decree's stated purpose of "govern[ing] the administra-
tive liability of legal persons," it amended certain CCA articles regarding penalties
and procedures. In writing this article, the author has utilized an English transla-
tion of the Decree, which can be found at http://www.merrillbrink.com/translation-
of-Brazil-decree-Clean-Company-Act-04062015.htm.
69. The President's stated goal in submitting MP 703 to the Legislature was to
"decreas[e] uncertainty and preserv[e] jobs." Brazil President Dilma Rousseff,
Speech on the Occasion of MP 703's Signature (Dec. 18, 2015). See also
Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 66, at 37 (noting that MP 703 provides for pros-
ecutors' enhanced participation in negotiating leniency agreements, grants the pos-
sibility for multiple companies to seek leniency in connection with the same facts
or events, and reinforces the requirement that a company have a legally adequate
compliance program in order to apply for leniency).
70. See Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 66, at 37-41.
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B. IMPORTANT RULES AND PROVISIONS
1. Strict Liability
One of the core components of the CCA is its strict liability frame-
work. Article 2 of the CCA provides that a legal entity "shall be held
strictly liable, administratively and civilly, for the injurious acts stipulated
herein performed in their interest or benefit."7 1 As such, the CCA makes
companies strictly liable for bribes or other prohibited acts committed by
their employees, officers, or agents for the company's benefit, regardless
of the potential absence of any corrupt intent on the part of the its man-
agers or directors.72 That is, so long as a prosecutor can show that the
illegal act occurred, then she need not prove any negligent or willful con-
duct by the corporation.7 3 As with any strict liability regime, the conse-
quence of such a severe standard is that a company may be liable for any
infraction by its employees or agents, even if the company had instituted
all necessary internal compliance programs, and "even [if] it had no
knowledge of such violation." 74
2. Prohibited Conduct: "Acts Harmful to the National or Foreign
Public Administration"
Aiming to prohibit more than just bribery in its basic, traditional sense,
article 5 of the CCA proscribes a deliberately broad range of practices to
encapsulate what the law will regard as "corrupt" acts.75 In this respect,
the CCA appears to embody a genuine attempt by Brazilian officials to
tackle corruption on an extensive scale. To achieve this end, the CCA
forbids "not only the actual payment or provision of any undue advan-
tage to any public official or third party, but also the acts of offering,
promising, sponsoring or otherwise supporting such activity." 7 6 The new
law likewise casts a wide net regarding the process of procuring govern-
ment contracts, prohibiting any "conduct that gives an unfair advantage"
or that may in any way jeopardize the competitive nature inherent to
public bidding.7 7 Specifically, the CCA provides that the following acts
constitute bribery of domestic or foreign officials: (i) promoting, offering,
71. Clean Company Act, art. 2.
72. See Carson et al., supra note 56.
73. See Michael Volkov, Brazil and Its Commitment to Anti-Corruption Enforcement,
VOLKOv L. GRP.: CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://cor-
ruptioncrimecompliance.com/2013/09/brazil-and-its-commitment-to-anti-corrup-
tion-enforcement/.
74. William M. Sullivan, Jr. et al., Preparing for Brazil's New Anti-Corruption Law:
What In-House Counsel Should Know 2, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAw PIrMAN
LLP (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert20l3
l03lLitigationPreparingforBrazilsNewAntiCorruption.pdf.
75. See Richard, supra note 62, at 360.
76. Marcelo Santos B. Correia, Myles Bartley & Regina Freitas, A Comparison of the
New Brazilian Anticorruption Law, the FCPA, and the UK Bribery Act, Assoc. OF
CORP. COUNSEL (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/
cnbalfuba.cfm?makepdf=1.
77. See Richard, supra note 62, at 360.
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or giving, directly or indirectly, "an improper benefit to a public agent" or
to a third person related to a public official; (ii) financing, funding, spon-
soring, or subsidizing in any way the performance of illegal acts prohib-
ited by the CCA; (iii) using a third party, whether an individual or legal
entity, to hide or cover up an offense, its perpetrators, or the beneficiaries
of illegal acts; (iv) hindering or defrauding, in any manner, the "competi-
tive nature" of public bidding for government contracts;7 8 and (v) hinder-
ing or interfering with the investigation or supervisory work of public
bodies and regulatory agencies. 79
3. Joint and Several Liability and Successor Liability Following
Corporate Transactions
Article 4 of the CCA imposes joint and several liability on the parent,
subsidiaries, and other related affiliates of a company that violates the
Act.80 Additionally, pursuant to the CCA's application of successor lia-
bility, an entity's liability will remain attached even after its organiza-
tional structure undergoes contractual changes, and/or following
corporate transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, transfers of owner-
ship, or amendments to the articles of incorporation.8 1 To limit the po-
tential risk of forcing companies to inherit unreasonably broad liability,
the CCA restricts a successor's liability to fines and restitution only up to
the value of assets transferred in the corporate transaction, and only for
actual damages caused.82
4. Sanctions
Commentators have agreed on at least one thing about the CCA: it
imposes upon its offenders a particularly harsh menu of potential fines
and penalties.8 3 In fact, when the CCA was being debated and finalized
by the legislature, then-President Rousseff vetoed proposed provisions
that sought to cap penalties at the value of the contract or bid at issue,
signifying just how little tolerance Brazilian officials are expected to have
in their efforts to punish corrupt actors under the CCA." This also
demonstrated that the severely punitive nature of the CCA was by no
78. Under Clean Company Act, art. 5(IV)(a)-(g), the CCA sets forth a more specific
and comprehensive list of prohibited acts in the context of public requests for bids
and contracts.
79. Id. arts. 5(I)-(V). See also Zaheer, supra note 65, at 466.
80. Clean Company Act, art. 4.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 4(1); Timothy W. Blakely et al., Brazil's New Clean Companies Act Contin-
ues Global Fight Against Corruption, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Aug. 6,2013),
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130806-Brazils-New-Clean-Compa-
nies-Act.pdf.
83. See Carlson & Wright, supra note 43; Julie DiMauro, Brazil's Clean Companies
Act-best practices for your supply chain, FCPA BLOG (May 2, 2014, 7:08 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/2/brazils-clean-companies-act-best-practices-
for-your-supply-c.html (noting that violations can result in fines of up to twenty
percent of company revenue).
84. See Arrieta, supra note 24, at 172.
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means unintended. Companies that violate the CCA will be subject to
the following range of administrative and legal punishments.85
a. Administrative Penalties
The administrative penalties available under the CCA include: (1)
fines, and (2) publication of the company's administrative sanctions in a
local or national newspaper, on the main page of its website, and on no-
tices viewable by the public at the company's offices. 86 Regarding possi-
ble monetary penalties, depending upon the presence or absence of
aggravating or mitigating factors specified in the CCA, companies may
incur fines of up to twenty percent of the business's gross revenue "from
the fiscal year prior to the initiation of administrative proceedings," or up
to "three times the value of the benefit sought or achieved."8 7 In the
event that gross revenue cannot be calculated, the Decree provides that
fines are to be calculated at a minimum value of either 0.1% of gross
revenues or R$6,000 ($3,000 USD), up to a maximum value of R$60 mil-
lion (roughly $30 million USD).8 8 Article 7 of the CCA, in conjunction
with articles 17 and 18 of the Decree, enumerates various factors that the
prosecuting body will take into account when determining the severity of
the fine. 89 The CCA's institution of these factors as a means for compa-
nies to receive mitigated penalties purports to "encourage companies to
self-regulate and incentivize [them] to cooperate with authorities in their
anti-corruption efforts." 90 Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below,
companies that ultimately enter into a leniency agreement with the rele-
vant authority may be able to receive an exemption or reduction of fines
that would have otherwise been imposed. 91
b. Legal Penalties
On top of the administrative penalties outlined above, companies that
violate the CCA may also receive severe judicial sanctions from a federal,
state, or municipal body.92 Such legal punishments may include disgorge-
ment of the benefits improperly obtained by the company, directly or in-
directly, as a result of the illegal act;9 3 suspension or partial interruption
of the company's operations; 94 debarment from receiving any govern-
ment funding or assistance for up to five years (i.e., exclusion from "in-
centives, subsidies, grants, donations, or loans from public bodies or ...
85. Clean Company Act, arts. 6, 18.
86. Id. art. 6(I)-(II); Decreto No. 8.420, arts. 17-22, 24.
87. Clean Company Act, art. 6(I); Decreto No. 8.420, art. 20(11).
88. Decreto No. 8.420, arts. 19-20.
89. Clean Company Act, art. 7; Id. arts. 17-18.
90. Blakely et al., supra note 82.
91. See Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 66, at 39.
92. See Carson et al., supra note 56.
93. Clean Company Act, art. 19(I) (providing for the "loss of assets, rights, or amounts
that represent a benefit or profit directly or indirectly obtained from the violation,
without prejudice to the rights of the injured or good-faith third party.").
94. Id. art. 19(11).
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financial institutions [ ] controlled by the public authorities"); 95 and worst
of all, "compulsory dissolution" of the entity.96 The drastic penalty of
mandatory dissolution is generally reserved for "extreme cases"97 in
which the entity was regularly used to facilitate illegal acts, or where the
entity was created for the purpose of hiding either the corrupt activity or
the identity of its beneficiaries.98
In addition to its distinct punitive function, another key goal of the
CCA is to serve as a preventative measure by integrating specific incen-
tives which, ideally, will motivate companies to detect and deter corrupt
acts before they occur. 99 To this end, the CCA incentivizes businesses to
invest in comprehensive compliance and prevention programs by al-
lowing courts to consider the content and effectiveness of a company's
internal "integrity program" as a factor that can mitigate its punish-
ment.100 These factors are discussed in detail below, but the important
takeaway is that legal penalties may be reduced where a company had in
place a legitimate compliance program that measured up to CCA
standards.
5. Leniency Agreements and the Possibility of Mitigated Sanctions
Article 16 of the CCA allows a company facing corruption charges to
negotiate and enter into a leniency agreement with the appropriate en-
forcement authority as a means of mitigating its ultimate punishment.101
An offending company's eligibility for reduced penalties under a leniency
agreement, however, depends on its fulfillment of certain requirements.
On December 21, 2015, the Brazilian government enacted Provisional
Measure 703, which modified the CCA's pre-existing leniency agreement
requirements and finalized the other rules governing such agreements. 102
First, under MP 703, companies facing charges under the CCA are no
longer required to be the first to state their interest in cooperating with
the government's investigation in order to be eligible for a leniency
agreement, nor are they required to admit that they knew of or partici-
pated in the violating activity alleged to have been committed.103 In justi-
fying the elimination of this prerequisite to leniency agreement eligibility,
the new legislation logically points out that it is needless to require an
95. Id. art. 19(lV); Carson et al., supra note 56.
96. Clean Company Act, art. 19(11).
97. Carson et al., supra note 56.
98. Clean Company Act, art. 19(IV)(1).
99. See Felipe Rocha dos Santos, New Anti-Corruption Regulation Reaffirms Brazil's




101. Clean Company Act, art. 16.
102. Provisional Measure No. 703, de 18 de Dezembro de 2015, Diario Oficial da Uniao
[D.O.U] de 12.21.2015 (Braz.) [hereinafter "MP 703"].
103. See Flesch et al., supra note 67.
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entity to admit guilt when the CCA already imposes strict liability. 10 4
Second, MP 703 provides that a "leniency agreement can be performed
with more than one legal entity in cases of collusion."10 5 In such multi-
party cases, only the first implicated company to self-report may obtain
complete immunity from financial sanctions, whereas companies that sub-
sequently self-disclose and later enter into a related leniency agreement
will only be eligible for a reduction of up to two-thirds of applicable fines
(which originally was the allowance for all companies).106 Third, any en-
tity that enters a leniency agreement may also receive a full exemption
from any "debarment-like" legal penalties, such as bans or limitations on
the right to bid and contract with the government.1 07 Fourth, MP 703
opens the door for leniency agreements to be made even after an action
under the CCA has already commenced.10 8 The Measure also reaffirmed
the requirement that, in order to receive leniency, a company must "un-
dertake to implement or improve [its] internal mechanisms for integrity,
auditing, [and] encouraging complaints," and must establish effective
codes of ethics and conduct.109
Lastly, and perhaps most critically, MP 703 incorporated an important
solution to a widely criticized inequity that existed under the CCA's origi-
nal framework for leniency agreements and voluntary disclosures. Before
MP 703, a company could unwittingly incur additional liability if its dis-
closed actions violated other areas of Brazilian law outside of the
CCA.110 That is, a company could hypothetically have settled a violation
under the CCA, only to expose itself to ensuing legal actions brought
under different laws or by other authorities.' This risk would have de-
terred companies from utilizing the CCA's leniency agreement provisions
entirely. To address this concern, MP 703 created a new rule which pro-
vides that, where the Public Prosecutor's Office and the applicable ad-
ministrative authority jointly enter a leniency agreement with a company
facing CCA charges, other government agencies and officials are thereby
prohibited from filing separate actions or continuing pending actions re-
104. Luis A.S. de Souza & Fabfola C. de Abreu, Brazil: Anticorruption Leniency Agree-
ments, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.ifir.com/Article/3539336/
Home/Brazil-Anti-corruption-leniency-agreements.html (also noting that this
amendment may serve to benefit the government's investigation, "to the extent
that individuals can contribute information and depositions without having to ad-
mit any wrongdoing.").
105. Exposiqgo de Motivos Interministerial [Explanatory Memorandum] (EMI) No.
00207/2015, Advocacia Geral da Unido (AGU) [Attorney General of the Union]
& Corregedoria Geral da Unido (CGU) [Comptroller General of the Union], de
18 de Dezembro de 2015, Portal da Presidencia da Reptiblica [P.P.R.] de
12.21.2015 (Braz.).
106. MP 703, art. 16; Clean Company Act, art. 16. See also Flesch et al., supra note 67.
107. MP 703, art. 16; Clean Company Act, art. 16. See also Flesch et al., supra note 67.
108. MP 703, art. 20; Clean Company Act, art. 20. See also Flesch et al., supra note 67.
109. MP 703, art. 16(1)(IV).
110. See Arrieta, supra note 24, at 173.
111. See Carlos Ayres, Factors to Consider Before Entering into leniency Agreements in
Brazil, FCPAMElIlCAS (July 2, 2014), http://fcpamericas.com/english/brazil/factors-
entering-leniency-agreements-brazil/.
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lated to the activities at issue.112
6. Compliance Program Requirements
As defined by the Decree, a company's compliance program, also
known as an "integrity program," should cultivate "mechanisms and in-
ternal procedures on integrity, auditability, and incentivized reporting of
irregularities, as well as effective application of codes of ethics and con-
duct, policies, and directives, aimed at detecting and correcting devia-
tions, fraudulent acts, irregularities, and illicit acts [ ] against the
[Brazilian] or a foreign government."1 1 3 In addition, the Decree requires
that companies' integrity programs be customized "in accordance with
the current characteristics and risks [of] each legal person" and be "con-
stantly improved and adapted in order to guarantee its effectiveness."' 1 4
Pursuant to the 2015 regulations, Brazilian regulators are to consider the
following factors when assessing whether an investigated entity's compli-
ance program is effective enough to warrant mitigated sanctions: (1) com-
mitment of senior management, "as evidenced by their visible and
unequivocal support for the program"; (2) standards of conduct and
codes of ethics for employees and third parties; (3) periodic compliance
training; (4) "periodic analysis of risks to make any necessary adapta-
tions"; (5) accurate accounting records of company transactions; (6) "spe-
cific procedures to prevent fraud and illicit acts within the context of ...
[government] contracts, or in any interaction with the public sector"; (7)
independence and authority of the internal body charged with enforcing
the program; (8) protections and channels for whistleblowers; (9) discipli-
nary measures for internal program violations; (10) procedures for imme-
diately ceasing violations and "timely remediation of any damages
caused"; and (11) transparency of the company's political donations. 1 5
Under Ordinance No. 909, corporate entities must provide the CGU
with a corporate profile report1 16 and a report on internal compliance
with their program policies." 7 In addition to laying out the structure of
its integrity program, a company must demonstrate: (1) that its program
incorporates the requirements mandated by Decree 8.420, (2) that it has
been integrated into daily operations, substantiated by actual data and
112. See Flesch et al., supra note 67.
113. Decreto No. 8.420, art. 41.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 42(I)-(XVI).
116. The entity's profile report must specify: (i) the industries and countries in which it
does business; (ii) its organizational structure and internal decision making
processes; (iii) its number of employees; (iv) the nature of its interactions with
domestic and foreign administration (e.g., number of government contracts and its
percentage of revenue therefrom, use of third party intermediaries to deal with
public sector); (v) its corporate structure; and (vi) whether it is a small size com-
pany. Carlos Ayres, Brazil Issues New Regulations on the Clean Companies Act,
FCPAMERICAS (Apr. 21, 2015), http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-
compliance/brazil-issues-regulations-clean-companies-act/.
117. Portaria No. 909, de 7 de Abril de 2015, Dibrio Oficial da Uniio [D.O.U.] de
4.8.2015 (Braz.).
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statistics, and (3) the extent to which the program succeeded in prevent-
ing, detecting, or mitigating the violations under investigation. 118
7. Enforcement Authority and Administrative and Judicial Procedures
A company's liability under the CCA is assessed through an Adminis-
trative Liability Proceeding (PAR), which must be concluded within 180
days after publication of the fact that proceedings have been initiated
against the entity.1 19 With respect to the particular government authority
responsible for adjudicating CCA violations in a given case, the first con-
tingency is whether the conduct at issue involves corrupt acts directed at
foreign or domestic officials. In cases involving the alleged bribery of
foreign, non-Brazilian officials, the federal CGU has exclusive authority
to enforce the CCA. 120 For cases of domestic bribery, the power to pros-
ecute CCA violations generally lies with the highest authority of the rele-
vant government body against which the alleged acts were committed.1 2 11
But, under certain circumstances, the CGU may also exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over such cases. 122 As this article will discuss, it is this fea-
ture-the CCA's wide dispersion of authority among all levels of govern-
ment-that has drawn perhaps the most concern and opposition.
VI. HOW THE CCA IS HOLDING UP TODAY: CURRENT
STATUS OF COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
One year after the CCA went into effect, Control Risks' global compli-
ance experts published a data-backed report showing that Brazil's corrup-
tion landscape has been improving ever since the CCA was enacted, thus
evidencing that a positive impact is already being effected. by the new
law.123 According to the report, "[a] geographical breakdown shows that
Brazil-based companies are [now] the most likely to investigate an em-
ployee" regarding bribe payments or other corrupt conduct, and as for
why this is so - "[it] is no doubt a response to the tighter compliance
environment in the wake of Brazil's Clean Company Act." 124 In ex-
pounding their anticipation that the CCA will effectively deter corruption
and enhance compliance, "a great many leading corporate lawyers ...
118. CGU Approves New Regulations in Connection with the Anti-Corruption Law,
MATTOS FILHO (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.mattosfilho.com.br/EscritorioMidia/
memocompl30415en.pdf.
119. Decreto No. 8.420, arts. 2, 9.
120. Id. art. 14.
121. Id. art. 3.
122. Id. art. 13. See also Carson et al., supra note 56 (explaining that art. 13 of the
Decree permits the CGU to exercise discretionary jurisdiction over claims of do-
mestic bribery where the relevant public entity "lacks objective conditions to con-
duct the PAR proceeding, the issues involved are highly complex, the public
contracts at issue involve a high amount, or the situation involves more than one
agency or entity of the federal government.").
123. See generally International Business Attitudes to Corruption Survey 2014 - 2015,
CONTROL RISKS Gma. (2015), https://www.controlrisks.com/-/media/Public%20
Site/Files/Reports/corruptionsurvey20l5.pdf.
124. Id. at 11.
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expect that Brazilian companies will increasingly see that compliance is a
good investment.. It's a long-term process, but . . . one that Brazil has
begun in good faith."1 25 In fact, many legal professionals are already wit-
nessing the fruition of this outcome. Because the CCA and its subse-
quent decrees culminated in "one of the most aggressive pieces of anti-
corruption legislation among the world's major economies," as of mid-
2016, "[1]awyers are already noting that compliance ... is []embedding
itself into the culture of Brazilian companies."1 26
Although Brazil's compliance culture may already be improving as a
result of the CCA's early presence, actual enforcement actions under the
new law have not been quite as swift. Brazil's National Registry of Pun-
ished Companies (CNEP), a database that compiles information about
companies punished under the CCA, reported that only seven companies
had received CCA sanctions as of early 2017, four of which were related
to the same enforcement action.127 With that said, however, Brazilian
officials have confirmed that "there are dozens of [CCA] proceedings in
the pipeline that should be resolved during 2017."128 Regarding these
pending actions, one source reported that, as of January of 2017, the
CGU had commenced liability proceedings under the CCA against
twenty-nine firms and is presently negotiating at least twelve leniency
agreements.1 29 By way of example, in May of 2015, the German firm
Bilfinger SE became the first company to seek a leniency agreement
under the CCA when it voluntarily disclosed that it paid bribes in connec-
tion with the 2014 World Cup.1 3 0 Additionally, several companies sought
leniency deals in connection with the rigorous investigations of the state-
run Petrobras (Petroleo Brasileiro SA) oil firm, which many have
deemed "Brazil's largest-ever corruption scandal."1 31 Although the mas-
sive Petrobras scandal has dominated the headlines, there are a number
of other CCA-related investigations under way against some of Brazil's
125. Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Brazil's Third Pillar: The Clean Companies Act,
FCPA BLOG (July 25, 2016, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/25/
andy-spalding-on-brazils-third-pillar-the-clean-companies-ac.html [hereinafter
Spalding, Brazil's Third Pillar].
126. George Croft, Countdown to the Olympics: What's being done to combat the Bra-
zilian corruption crisis?, LEGAL CHEEK (June 17, 2016, 12:39 PM), http://www
.legalcheek.com/lc-journal-posts/countdown-to-the-olympics-whats-being-done-to-
combat-the-brazilian-corruption-crisis/.
127. See Carlos Ayres,.Anti-Bribery in Brazil: 2016 Year in Review (Part II), FCPAMER-
LCAS (Mar. 3, 2017), http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-compliance/
anti-bribery-brazil-2016-year-review-part-ii/#.
128. Id.
129. Domingos Paiva, PhD, The Historic Odebrecht Settlement, ETHIC INTELLIGENCE
(Jan. 2017), http://www.ethic-intelligence.com/experts/17671-historic-odebrecht-
settlement/.
130. Caroline Stauffer, Brazil Comptroller Says Germany's Bilfinger Seeking Leniency
Deal, REUTERS (May 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-corruption-
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most powerful corporations and politicians.1 3 2
Based on the history surrounding other countries' adoption of new
anti-corruption regimes, this seemingly slow enforcement timeline should
not be seen as a cause for concern. For the first twenty-three years after
the U.S. government enacted the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), there were only nine total enforcement actions brought under
the FCPA, but "since [2000], there have been 139."133 Thus, "the lack of
corporate enforcement of the [CCA] in the three years since the law's
passage does not mean that enforcement isn't coming."1 34 Having only
been in force since 2014, "Brazilian law enforcement priorities are still
developing" and "[c]hanges to the scope and implementation of the CCA
are ongoing." 3 5 As one expert explained, "we should not be surprised to
hear our friends in Brazilian enforcement report that it may take some
time for this new paradigm to really take hold in Brazil. We should all be
patient in the meantime."13 6 This is all to say that, in the world of legisla-
tion, particularly in the anti-corruption arena, the CCA is still "a very
new law,"' 37 so it is simply too early to realistically measure its success or
evaluate its enforcement.
VII. THE PROMISE OF BRAZIL'S UNPRECEDENTED ANTI-
CORRUPTION MOVEMENT TRUMPS THE CONCERNS
OF THE CCA'S CRITICS
A. THE CCA's STATUTORY STRENGTHS AND OTHER
REASONS FOR OPrMIsM
While Brazil's corporate environment of voluntary compliance and the
public sector's resolve to enforce anti-corruption laws will indefinitely be
vulnerable to a multitude of political and cultural factors, the govern-
ment's continuous execution of legislation aimed at bolstering the CCA is
"proof that Brazil is taking clear steps to implement strong anticorruption
132. The details surrounding Brazil's many ongoing corruption cases is beyond the
scope of this article. For a more comprehensive list and summary of such cases,
see Ryan E. Bonistalli & Alex J. Brackett, Anti-Corruption Enforcement in Brazil
is in High Gear, McGuHiEWOODS - SUBJECT TO INQUIRY (Sept. 2, 2015), http://
www.subjecttoinquiry.com/compliance/anti-corruption-enforcement-in-brazil-is-in-
high-gear/; Brazil Ramps Up Anti-Corruption Efforts, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, ANTI-
ColuxuI-rnoN Q. 1Q/2015, at 6-7 (Apr. 2015), http://www.sidley.com/-/media/up-
date-pdfs/2015/05/anticorruption-quarterly-1st-quarter-2015.pdf.
133. Laura Tulchin, Crisis in Brazil: where does corporate compliance go from here?,
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laws."1 .38 And there are additional reasons to be optimistic about the im-
minent impact of the CCA, some of which even predate its enactment.
1. Brazil's Increasing Effort and Demonstrated Intent to Punish
Corruption
Before the CCA arrived on Brazil's anti-corruption scene, it appeared
that the Brazilian government had already begun to amp up its efforts to
eradicate corruption. From 2008 to 2012, the number of individuals con-
victed for corruption-related crime increased by 133%.1.39 And in 2012,
Brazil's Supreme Court sent a powerful message when, in the high-profile
"Mensalao" case, it sentenced Jos6 Dirceu, former chief of staff to Presi-
dent Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva and thus "the second most powerful man
in Brazil," 140 to over ten years in prison for corruption in a vote buying
scandal.141 In 2013, the year leading up to the CCA, Brazil's "federal
police conducted 296 special operations to combat corruption, money
laundering, and related crimes," which resulted in the arrest of 1,785 indi-
viduals, including ninety-six public employees.14 2 In total, "[a]s of the
end of February 2016, 84 notable politicians, business executives, and as-
sociates had been convicted in federal courts of embezzlement of public
funds, conspiracy, and money laundering, and had served or were serving
hard time."1.43 These likely unexpected convictions symbolized a warning
that Brazil courts would no longer allow the nation's corporate and politi-
cal leaders to believe that they are above the law. Not only has Brazil's
highest court proved that the judiciary can and will act independently,1 4 4
but it has also demonstrated the government's increasing resolve to lock
up even the most powerful Brazilian figures. If Brazil's recent history
suggests anything, it is that "the passivity that was once expected of law
enforcement officials in the face of revelations of wrongdoing is a thing of
the past."1 45
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140. Jailed at Last, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ameri-
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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-24967116 (reporting that the Court
found Dirceu devised a scheme to use public funds to buy support from opposition
parties in Congress.).
142. Flesch et al., supra note 139.
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Before Brazil's legislative and judicial branches started cultivating a
stricter stance on corruption, studies conducted by Transparency Interna-
tional found that, historically, Brazil's biggest problem was a lack of pun-
ishment by the courts.146 That is, Brazilian officials "caught corruption in
the past and there were massive scandals, but [courts] rarely managed to
punish anybody. This new law changes the dynamic." 147 While the coun-
try's fight against corruption faces a long and difficult road, "2015 sent a
strong warning to the corrupt," as Brazilians finally saw the people who
looked "untouchable" for so many years being investigated for corrup-
tion.148 Many who have weighed in on the CCA are optimistic that the
undeniably severe penalties imposed by the new law will act as "a wake-
up call for the management and shareholders of Brazilian companies and
will help ensure that businesses do not bribe their way to contracts." 14 9
In fact, corrupt businesses are already being hunted down at a rate that
almost certainly could not have been expected at such a young stage of
the CCA's existence.1 50 In hopefully describing the foreseeable impact of
this national shift toward stricter policing of Brazil's politicians and busi-
ness leaders, one commentator explained how exactly these changes
could facilitate an improved compliance culture: "You now have senior
politicians . .. who got into the game of extracting personal wealth-and
they're being flushed out. That will have a sobering effect on those who
are tasked with taking their places. The next generation [will] say, 'We
don't want to go down that road."' 15 1
Perhaps equally important is the fact that Brazilian law firms are also
beginning to make concerted efforts to facilitate and contribute to the
positive changes in Brazil's legal environment with respect to corruption.
Firms are rapidly expanding their compliance practice groups for three
important and promising reasons: (1) to "ensur[e] corporate clients
strictly follow Brazilian [CCA] legislation," (2) because they "believe the
number of judicial and administrative cases is going to increase" due to
the CCA's unprecedented vigor, and (3) because they "want to be part of
this movement" - a factor that is essential to. the CCA's success. 152
Ever since the CCA's passage, Brazil's headlines have been dominated
by what seems like a never-ending deluge of large-scale corruption scan-
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dals. That Brazil's corruption probes have garnered such massive and
frequent attention can point to two contrasting conclusions about the
CCA's initial efficacy. On the one hand, some say, "in cleaning up [Bra-
zil's] much-maligned public image as a corruption-littered country, the
CCA's positive effects have been [ ] overshadowed by . .. daily news re-
ports of widespread corruption."' 5 3 The more optimistic view, however,
perceives a more convincing inference: the fact that Brazil's escalation in
corruption investigations is garnering so much attention does not imply
that the rate of corruption has risen since the CCA, but instead, that it is
being better regulated. 154 This school of thought takes the position that
"more news coverage is evidence of better policing and improving trans-
parency. "155 As one proponent of this view explained, the media, which
"seemingly thrives on a sky-is-falling narrative," 1 56 are "failing to grasp
the true meaning of this Brazilian moment. Even the most sophisticated
news sources paint a picture of unmitigated chaos, crisis, and collapse....
But that narrative [ ] misses the bigger point."15 7 The real questions
should be "why are we talking about this now? . . . Why all the investiga-
tions . . . What changed?"158 As for why "the maelstrom of Brazilian
corruption erupted today, and not a few years ago" and why the world
seems to be hearing much more about high-profile corruption investiga-
tions, it is because "those once subject to little more than resentment are
now held accountable under the law. . . . Brazil is not what it once was.
Impunity is no longer the order of the day; neither the rich nor the pow-
erful are above the law." 159
To couch all of these promising signs into a broader context, "Brazil is
changing. Culturally, legally, and institutionally, the country is no longer
tolerating corruption. The so-called jeitinho Brasileiro has lost its
charm."' 6 0 Indeed, the recent surge in corruption scandals at the highest
levels of government and business "should be seen not as a crisis, but as a
triumph for the rule of law."161 With the help of both the CCA and Bra-
zilian's recent revolt against the corrupt, Brazil is "[a]rmed with new legal
tools, [and] enforcement officials have ushered in a new era in Brazilian
153. George M. Melo, Brazil's Clean Companies Act: One Year Later, is it Finally Get-
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government, founded on a new set of cultural assumptions." 16 2 If this
momentum is able to sustain itself, Brazil is poised to rid itself of the
jeitinho Brasilerio ethos.
2. Pre-CCA Legislation Aimed at Improving Transparency and
Preventing Corruption
Another factor that bodes well for the CCA's prospective impact is
that, in the years leading up to the CCA, Brazil had already been ac-
cumulating targeted legislation aimed at changing Brazil's compliance
culture, disenabling corruption, and increasing transparency in the public
sector.1 63 In 2009, the Brazil Legislature passed a Transparency Law that
strengthened the rules under its 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law. 164 Spe-
cifically, the law obligates public entities at every level, from the execu-
tive branch down to municipal governments, "to publish detailed budget
data online in real time," and imposes penalties for state entities that fail
to do so. 1 6 5 The Transparency Law also enhanced the controls on public
spending and debt levels, increased managerial accountability, and im-
proved the transparency of public accounts. 166
One year later, at the behest of a petition signed by nearly three mil-
lion Brazilians insisting that its leaders do something about the nation's
rampant electoral corruption,167 Brazil enacted the 2010 Clean Record
Law. 168 The law "bars candidates from running for public office for eight
years if they have been convicted of a serious crime, are facing pending
criminal charges, lost their political positions due to corruption, or re-
signed to avoid impeachment."16 9
Implemented in 2011, Brazil's Access to Information Law expanded
citizens' right and ability to demand and obtain information about public
spending. 170 Under this law, all federal, state, and municipal bodies must
"publish information regarding public finance, including documents on
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government spending and administration."17 1 Specifically, the law af-
fords citizens the right "to request information from all levels of govern-
ment, the legislature, and the judiciary." 172 As part of this legislation,
Brazil created a "Transparency Portal," and the public's utilization
thereof has already proven to be instrumental. 7 3 As illustrated by the
largescale protests in 2013, the portal has aided citizens' efforts to hold its
leaders accountable by monitoring how public funds are being spent and
publicly denouncing corrupt transactions.
All of this is to say that, despite the historic perception to the contrary,
Brazil's political will to defeat corruption has been gaining momentum in
recent years. Against the backdrop of these various anti-corruption mea-
sures being put in place, the CCA should be well-supported and well-
positioned to deliver a legitimate blow to Brazil's toxic corruption
culture.
3. Strict Liability
The CCA's strict liability regime would not have been possible under a
criminal law framework, as penal laws require proof of intent, a mental
state that cannot be attributed to a legal entity.1 74 Because Brazil's previ-
ous anti-corruption laws had existed exclusively within its criminal code,
the government could only target and prosecute individuals for corrupt
acts, which unfortunately "saved companies from the kind of punishment
that could threaten their operations." 7 5 Indeed, Brazil's prior anti-cor-
ruption framework created "a dangerous regulatory gap" in the form of a
loophole that protected entities from punishment for corrupt practices.
But under the CCA's new regulatory system, companies in Brazil will no
longer be able to hide under this shield, as the government, for the first
time, will be able to hold companies legally accountable for the corrupt
acts from which they benefit. Additionally, because the CCA's strict lia-
bility scheme means "a company is still liable even if it can prove that it
took steps to prevent corruption," businesses will likely be far less toler-
ant of fraudulent conduct than ever before, knowing that the "entire or-
ganization could be held responsible for the underhanded activities of
even a few bad apples."'76 A less obvious advantage of the CCA's impo-
sition of strict liability is that, procedurally, it is uniquely suited to over-
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come the historic inefficiency of Brazil's judicial system.177 The CCA's
administrative enforcement process may too serve as an additional deter-
rent of corrupt practices, as it allows for companies to face charges signifi-
cantly quicker than they would in the more drawn out course of Brazil's
civil procedures. 178
4. Decentralized Enforcement
The wide allocation of power under the CCA's system of decentralized
enforcement has received both praise and criticism. Advocates of the
CCA's multi-level enforcement structure, which has been characterized
as one of "institutional multiplicity," argue that "the overlap of anti-cor-
ruption functions among various governmental entities . . . strengthen[s]
outcomes by allowing institutions to compete, to collaborate, to comple-
ment one another, or to compensate for one another's deficiencies or
oversights." 17 9 According to this line of reasoning, where a country's "ju-
dicial institutions face severe problems of rigidity and overall ineffi-
ciency" (as history has shown to be true of Brazil), it is more effective to
apply a broad and flexible institutional approach that "reli[es] on admin-
istrative processes and sanctions as an alternative way to investigate and
punish corporations [without] relying uniquely on the Judiciary."1 80 In
this respect, having various levels of government investigate and enforce
the CCA may well be the most promising approach "to overcome [Bra-
zil's] longstanding barriers to an effective accountability system." 81 Bra-
zil's Executive Branch emphasized this very notion in its original
proposal of the CCA bill to Congress, offering the following rationale for
the law's decentralized enforcement structure: "The administrative pro-
cess [was chosen] because it has revealed to be speedy and effective in
deterring mismanagement in administrative contracts and procurement
procedures, proving to be more able to provide fast responses to
society."182
B. THE CCA's PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES
1. Lack of Centralized Enforcement and Questionable Reliance on
Municipal Governments
Many commentators have criticized the CCA for being implemented
without an adequately integrated framework for uniform national en-
forcement. Such critics contend that "what exists now is a fragmented
enforcement regime consisting of autonomous entities that compete both
177. See Arrieta, supra note 24, at 172.
178. See id.
179. Carson et al., supra note 56, at 6.
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Mensagem No. 52 Executive a Congresso Nacional (Message 52 from Executive to
National Congress), de 8 de fevereiro de 2010, EMI No. 00011/2009 - CGU/MJ/
AGU (Braz.).
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within and between the federal, state, and municipal levels." 183 With that
in mind, some have expressed concerns about the CCA's allocation of
essentially equal enforcement power to both the CGU/federal officers
and to municipalities/local low-level officials.184
Critics argue that because the CCA does not assign a specific govern-
ment agency exclusive authority to enforce the new law, such decentral-
ized enforcement "is likely to lead to inconsistent rulings and
standards." 185 As a report published by the World Bank explained,
"[d]ue to the Brazilian federation model, there are 5,589 [public] entities
empowered to enforce sanctions against corrupt acts . . . the abundant
number of colegitimates empowered to apply the [CCA] and its penalties
could lead to inconveniently conflicting decisions." 8 6 Having a system
that tasks such a diverse and voluminous range of public bodies to en-
force the CCA inherently runs the risk of facilitating inconsistent inter-
pretations of the new law.
Second, given the unfortunate reality that Brazil's "many municipali-
ties [ ] have a deficient or incipient administrative structure, a lack of re-
sources, or an insufficiently trained staff,"187 some are both concerned
and skeptical as to whether local officials will truly be capable of effec-,
tively enforcing a law as complex as the CCA.1 88 Aside from municipali-
ties' practical (in)ability to enforce the CCA, the greater concern is
whether local officials will have the willpower to even attempt to do so.
Bearing in mind the historically corrupt proclivities of Brazilian leaders at
every level of government, the question becomes "whether such mul-
tilevel enforcement will actually create more possibilities for illegal con-
duct in light of competing [ ] interests and Brazil's culture."1 89 In other.
words, knowing what we do about Brazil's culturally intimate relationship.
with treating corruption as the status quo, is it not fair to question
whether "[m]unicipal governments [will] use their investigative authority
as leverage to extort companies by threatening to bring actions under the
CCA"?190 Putting all of this together, the central question underlying
this critique is whether or not the CCA's decentralized enforcement
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structure will ultimately enable the very corruption it was designed to
extinguish.
2. The Potential Pitfalls of Leniency Agreements
Another criticism of the CCA involves the potentially negative conse-
quences that may be borne by its encouragement of companies to negoti-
ate and enter into leniency agreements. Much of the controversy and
resistance surrounding leniency agreements has come from Brazilian
prosecutors.' 91 First, they argue that "such agreements may hinder ongo-
ing criminal investigations by allowing corporations to resolve allegations
without providing any new evidence."1 92 Second, prosecutors reasonably
conceive this facilitation of reduced punishment as "yet another loophole
for well-connected parties to avoid meaningful penalties." 193 The hope,
however, is that Decree No. 8,420 will succeed in its aim to clarify these
concerns surrounding enforcement, but only time will tell if this measure
was sufficient to cure the CCA's purported enforcement defects.
VIII. MOVING FORWARD: PROPOSED FOCUS AREAS FOR
FUTURE CCA DEVELOPMENTS
A cultural obstacle that continues to impede Brazil's efforts to diminish
corruption and improve its compliance culture is the reality that the na-
tion's elites have proliferated a social dynamic wherein "whistleblowers
are considered traitors and are victims of threats and persecution." 1 9 4 As
it stands today, one who reports corruption often does so with the under-
standing that he or she will potentially face retaliatory repercussions. But
this type of courage should not be a prerequisite for uncovering and re-
porting graft. The significant practical effects of such intimidation should
not be overlooked from the legislative or judicial perspective, as evidence
proffered by "people that speak-up about corruption in Brazil . . . is es-
sential for uncovering corruption in all sectors and levels of society. That
is why it is so important to guarantee their protection."19 5 Otherwise,
fewer people will be willing to come forward to expose corruption that
may have otherwise been investigated and weeded out. It is doubtful that
the CGU's mere insistence that companies implement internal
whistleblower protections will be enough. Protective legislation for
whistleblowers may prove to be a necessity.
A majority of the corrupt practices that take place in Brazil are driven
by manipulation and pressure at the hands of local officials. As such, to
address the historically valid uncertainty regarding both the sheer capa-
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bility and ethical willpower of municipal officials to enforce the CCA, the
Brazil government should grant the federal CGU new powers and re-
sources to oversee local CCA proceedings, regulate the propriety of lo-
cal-level enforcement, and ensure proper implementation. Additionally,
although it may require new legislation outside the scope of the CCA's
coverage, Brazil should consider efforts to curb the role of private entities
in the country's campaign finance system. Limiting business contribu-
tions to political campaigns, requiring candidates to provide complete dis-
closure of donations, and instituting a lower ceiling on campaign spending
at every level may limit the opportunities for politicians and wealthy busi-
ness leaders to engage in the type of corruption that has long been facili-
tated by Brazil's electoral process.
IX. CCA PRACTICE GUIDE FOR COMPANIES
OPERATING IN BRAZIL
Companies that conduct business in Brazil would be wise to take a
hard look at how they monitor and prevent their employees, third-party.
agents, subsidiaries, and any other related affiliates from engaging in cor-
rupt practices. Meaningful self-reflection, however, is just the beginning
of what is necessary to avoid the risk of corporate catastrophe at the
hands of the CCA. Indeed, because the CCA differs from the FCPA and
other anti-corruption laws around the world, it is vital that international
companies doing business in Brazil actively adjust their internal compli-
ance systems to reflect and accommodate the CCA's new demands.1 96
Specifically, to protect against any oversights that could lead to liability
under the CCA, businesses should: (1) train all employees, especially
those who interact with public officials, on the types of payments and
conduct prohibited by the CCA, (2) perform an in-depth self-risk assess-
ment, and (3) update their existing corruption-related policies to align
with the CCA. 197 Because the CCA holds companies jointly and sever-
ally liable for the conduct of its agents, firms should also extensively vet
and regulate any third parties who deal with public officials on their be-
half (e.g., distributors, local contractors, etc.). 198 Lastly, the CCA's strict
liability framework should inspire companies to begin fostering a strict,
zero-tolerance compliance policy.
Companies in Brazil must realize that effective prevention will not only
improve the country's welfare, but will also yield a direct pay-off for their
business. The CCA was intentionally designed so that firms would bene-
fit from choosing the carrot instead of the stick; it "leave[s] room for leni-
ency if a company maintains good controls and cooperates in an
196. See generally Carlson & Wright, supra note 43.
197. See Jonathan R. Barr et al., The FCPA on Steroids: Brazil Ups the Ante in Fighting
Corporate Corruption, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www
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198. See Berg et al., supra note 12.
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investigation ... [companies] can protect themselves by performing regu-
lar risk assessments regarding their [local] operations, and solidifying a
compliance program to mitigate identified risks."1 99 From a broader per-
spective, companies' executives, managers, and third-party agents simply
must overhaul the ways in which they get things done, especially when
certain aspects of their operation require interaction with a public office.
Aside from the now-statutory obligation to intensify their compliance
programs, companies must earnestly confront corrupt officials by pushing
back against improper solicitations. As a partner at a prominent Brazil-
ian law firm has suggested, "companies will have to adopt a tougher pos-
ture with government officials - not only refusing to pay bribes but
reporting corrupt officials and taking legal action against them." 200
X. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Brazil and its Latin American neighbors are in
the midst of an historic "anti-corruption moment." 201 The region is fi-
nally "see[ing] bribery and corruption [] transition from being 'business
as usual' to being very risky business," and Brazil is "among the countries
that are taking the lead to develop new and enhanced [ ] anti-corruption
enforcement regimes." 2 0 2 And the persistent anti-corruption activism go-
ing on in Brazil is spreading rapidly, as protestors are "taking to the
streets in Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras to challenge the
status quo and demand accountability from their political leaders." 2 0 3
Following the lead of Mexico and Colombia, Brazil's enactment of the
CCA makes it the third Latin American country to have passed compre-
hensive anti-corruption laws in recent years. 2 0 4
As for who and what will be most critical to Brazil's success in employ-
ing the CCA, the reality is that companies themselves bear a tremendous
and unavoidable responsibility. Although it is too early to tell whether
they will remain faithful to the anti-corruption movement or whether
their dedication will only come if and when they are caught, corporate
players are at least pledging to do their part. For example, Odebrecht
SA, a company implicated in the Petrobras scandal, has vowed to over-
haul its transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms, and its executives
have publically acknowledged their responsibility to "collaborate with
prosecutors to help 'build a better Brazil.' " 2 0 5 If the CCA is to bring
about meaningful change, this sentiment must find its way into the corpo-
rate mentality of all companies operating in Brazil.
199. Deloitte Forensic, Brazil's Clean Companies Act: Friend or Foe for Multination-
als?, DELOITTE (2014), http://news.acc.com/accwm/downloads/8426913%20AFA%
20Brazil%2OAnti-corruption%20POV-Deloitte%20ForensicFINAL.pdf.
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BRAZIL'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE
As commendable and promising as the CCA may seem, it is only the
starting point for Brazil's newfound rejuvenation in the fight against cor-
ruption. It is one thing for laws to be in place, but it is quite another for
them to be respected. Without question, "[t]his moment in Brazilian his-
tory is a beautiful and astonishing success story for anti-corruption re-
forms, the rule of law, and even democracy itself." 206 But for Brazil to
effectively sever the grip of corruption, it will require more than political
will and legislative measures. Instituting the CCA was undoubtedly a
necessary and promising first step, but Brazil's mission to tackle its histor-
ically debilitating tolerance for corruption will require a unified effort
from not only every level of government, but also from every level of
society. Perhaps most vital is the onus that Brazilian people and business
leaders must take upon themselves to break free from the country's un-
written social law of "jeitinho brasileiro," and to reverse the longstanding
culture of corruption to which they have grown so accustomed. 207 The
CCA, if truly honored and enforced, has the potential to repair Brazil's
global image and put an end to the corruption by which it has long been
plagued. Make no mistake, Brazil's passage of such a punitive and exten-,
sive anti-corruption law was an improbable achievement, and this unprec-'
edented opportunity is one that the people of Brazil simply cannot afford
to waste.
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ADVISER] (Feb. 7, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.conjur.com.br/2014-fev-07/lei-an-
ticorrupcao-frear-terceirizacao-areas-lidam-governo (noting the challenge of
changing Brazil's "jeitinho" culture).
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